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Abstract
Regional integration proposals often require agreements between countries
that differ in geographic size, resource endowments, transportation assets, tech-
nologies, and product quality. In this asymmetric setting, questions arise about
the potential for mutual gains and the distribution of benefits among industries
and workers in each country. This paper examines how regional integration be-
tween a small landlocked country and a large neighboring country–with a unique
port facility that both nations must use to export goods–affects the wage and lo-
cation decisions of firms, the allocation of labor, the welfare of each countrys
workers and firms, and aggregate measures of economic welfare in each country
and the region. A simulated spatial labor market model is used to explore the eco-
nomic effects of various stages of regional integration. Beginning with autarky as
a benchmark case, we consider two forms of regional integration partial mobil-
ity (mobile labor with geographically restricted firms); and full mobility (mobile
labor and firms) with convergence of production technologies and product quality.
Keywords: regional integration, spatial, location, migration, labor
I. INTRODUCTION
Regional integration proposals often call for agreements between countries that
differ greatly in geographic size, resource endowments, technologies, and transportation
assets.  Because of such differences, regional integration is usually contentious,
especially for less dominant countries.  Integration may allow economically or
geographically disadvantaged countries to gain access to a larger product market, a larger
labor pool, and better transportation facilities (ports, rail systems, airports, etc.).  But
regional integration also poses risks to smaller countries, including the possible out-
migration of firms and workers and a loss of domestic market share.  The risk inherent in
such agreements likely depends on the degree of dissimilarity between potential bloc
members and the extent of the proposed economic integration.  In this environment,
questions naturally arise about the potential for mutual gains and the distribution of
benefits among industries and workers in each country.
Such questions often reflect political and economic self-interests, but they might be
well founded.  Previous studies show that asymmetries often contribute to an uneven
distribution of the costs and benefits of regional integration (Edwards and Savastano
1989; Foroutan 1993; and Ben-David 1993).  When such asymmetries are especially
strong, regional blocs may fail to form if some countries expect the economic or political
costs of integration to exceed their perceived gains.  Some of the largest asymmetries
involve demographic or geographic differences: population size, geographic area, amount
of arable land, natural ports, etc.  It therefore seems useful to study the potential effects of
these “unnatural marriages” between dissimilar countries within a spatial setting that
explicitly incorporates such features.
2In this paper we use spatial methods to consider an extreme case where regional
integration is proposed for two neighboring countries that differ in several key ways.
Because the situation resembles that faced by India and its smaller neighbor, Nepal, we
refer to the two countries in the model as I and N.  Country I has a larger population
(labor pool) and geographically dwarfs country N.  Country I also enjoys direct export
access to world markets through its own port.  N also exports its products to the world,
but because it is landlocked it must ship its output through country I to use I’s port.  (It
should be noted that the “port” as an export node fits nicely into the spatial framework,
but it can be more generally viewed as a unique transportation asset of the larger
country). Finally, relative to N, country I also initially enjoys a technological advantage
in the form of higher labor productivity and produces a higher quality good that
commands a higher export price.  In sum, country I comes to regional integration holding
all the economic cards.
Given these imbalances between I and N, what are the effects of various degrees of
regional integration?  In particular, can N’s firms or workers benefit from regional
integration with a neighbor as dominant as country I?  Is partial integration preferable to
a more complete form of regional integration?  Does I, which already seems to have the
upper hand, have anything further to gain from regional integration with its smaller
neighbor?  If regional integration occurs, how will the benefits or costs be distributed
among firms and workers of each country?  Such questions will be addressed within the
spatial model developed here.  Because our model is relatively simple and our
simulations are specific, the results are only suggestive.
3Why a spatial model?  First, as noted, some of the most important asymmetries
between potential members of regional blocs involve area, distance, and transportation
assets--features that can easily be represented in spatial models.  Second, spatial models
readily capture product or labor market competition between economic rivals, providing a
mechanism for the determination of market shares.  This is a particularly attractive
feature because some of the key questions about regional integration focus on the size of
these market shares, before and after integration.  Finally, spatial models lend themselves
to analyses of mobility, and regional integration often allows or actively encourages
increased mobility of workers and firms.  In Section III, we develop a spatial model that
displays these critical features, but first it is useful to briefly review some previous
studies of regional integration.
II. EARLIER STUDIES
Traditionally, the overall welfare effect of regional integration is measured by the
potential of the agreement to increase the region's volume of trade (Viner 1950).  The
welfare effects of regional integration, however, also should be measured by the specific
impacts on wage income, employment, and the potential gain or loss of industries in a
region.  The debate over NAFTA demonstrated that the welfare implications of regional
integration go well beyond the potential to generate a higher volume of regional trade.
The effects of regional integration on industrial location and labor markets constitute
important issues that often prove to be the greatest obstacles to integration and the most
difficult ones to resolve.  Such issues have been addressed in previous studies.
4Many earlier papers ignored the role of distance, location, and transportation costs in
determining the welfare effects of regional integration on member countries, but more
recent welfare assessments of regional integration have adopted spatial methods.
Specifically, the use of economic geography models by Krugman (1991) and others has
bolstered interest in the role of space in trade.  Krugman’s model shows that demand
linkages can generate manufacturing clusters.  In subsequent studies, the model has been
extended to address different issues of regional integration (e.g., Krugman and Venables
1995; Puga and Venables 1997; and Ludema and Wooton 1997).  These studies mainly
focus on regional integration, industrial location, and regional inequalities.
Other studies (Venables 1994; Baldwin and Venables 1995; and Puga 1999) measure
the impact of regional integration on wage differentials and industrial structure.  These
studies show that integration can cause relative wages to diverge or converge, depending
upon wage rigidity and labor mobility.  Venables (1994), for example, argues that
regional integration can cause industries to agglomerate in a few locations, causing
divergence in the structure of the integrating economies and their income levels.
Similarly, Baldwin and Venables (1995) argue that as trade barriers fall industry can be
drawn to higher wage locations, thereby increasing interregional wage differences.  They
show that if wages are fixed regional integration will lead to a divergence of industrial
structure.  But if wages are flexible, they also show that integration will lead to a
divergence of relative wages, up to a point, and convergence thereafter.  Puga (1999) also
justifies this argument in terms of labor mobility.  He suggests that if labor is mobile,
higher wages will draw workers to more industrialized regions, intensifying
agglomeration and eliminating wage differentials.  If workers are immobile, however,
5interregional wage differences will persist.  Krugman (1993) further argues that even if
other non-land factors are mobile across countries, national boundaries can remain major
barriers to labor flows.
Prior to Krugman’s (1991) work, Hotelling’s (1929) seminal paper served as the
basis for much of the spatial pricing literature and provided a rationale for agglomeration
that depends on market-share competition between sellers rather than trade linkages
among producers or consumers.  Hotelling’s model also emphasizes the role of
transportation (transaction) costs in determining equilibrium industrial locations.  The
basic idea of the model is that market-share competition between two mobile sellers of a
homogeneous product leads to their agglomeration at the center of a bounded linear
market.  This agglomeration, however, can be inefficient, in that other site assignments
might improve consumer welfare without harming producers.
Variants of the Hotelling model have been used to examine not just the equilibrium
prices, wages, and locations of firms, but also the welfare effects of easing trade barriers.
These studies range from analyses of price and location equilibria in a product market
using price-location games, to analyses of the welfare effects of autarky versus free trade
between two regions (Gronberg and Meyer 1982; Benson and Hartigan 1983; Fujita and
Thisse 1986; Anderson and Neven 1991; Hatzipanayotou and Heffley 1991; Anderson
and de Palma 1992; Anderson, de Palma, and Hong 1992; and Anderson, de Palma, and
Nesterov 1995).
Most spatial pricing models focus on a product market with buyers and firms, and
ignore labor market features that also could affect firms' location decisions. A spatial
pricing model of the labor market can be used to analyze the effects of spatial
6competition on wages, employment, and industrial location, but simplicity in such models
often requires less complete treatment of product market competition.  Relatively few
studies have focused on labor markets using a spatial pricing model.  Nakagome (1985,
1986, 1988, 1991) has done considerable work in this area.  In his first study, Nakagome
(1985) examines the existence of equilibrium wages as well as spatial unemployment
under free and restricted labor mobility.  His results suggest that spatial competition with
fully mobile labor yields a lower equilibrium wage than a spatial monopsonist would
offer, and full employment cannot be guaranteed.  Similarly, incorporating both the
product and labor markets, Nakagome (1988) examines the impact of spatial competition
and technological innovation on wage rates.  He finds that the greater the labor supply,
the more likely the wage rate will fall as labor productivity increases.  In his analysis, the
supply of labor is assumed to be a linear function of the real wage net of commuting
costs.
Most spatial pricing models assume a bounded market in which two competing firms
have equal access to the product (or labor) market.  In using such a framework to
examine regional integration among dissimilar countries, however, it is useful to consider
the situation where one country’s producers have certain advantages over their rivals in
the other country, in terms of market size or accessibility.  We do this by positing a
situation where there are two firms, one that is located in a smaller landlocked country
and ships its exports to the world market via the larger country’s port.  Firms in the larger
country have access to a larger labor pool as well as better access to the port.  In this
situation, regional integration that allows workers, and perhaps firms, to move from one
country to the other could have interesting effects on wages, employment, output, profits,
7the relative welfare of the two countries, and the overall welfare of the region.  Section III
describes such a model, which will then be used in Section IV to analyze the effects of
various degrees of regional integration.  Section V offers some final remarks.
III. THE MODEL
The model developed in this study will be used to analyze the impact of regional
integration on the wage and location decisions of two export-oriented firms in a spatial
economy that consists of two "linear" countries, I and N.  Country I is relatively large, in
geographic size and population, and has a port.  Country N is a smaller landlocked
economy with no direct access to ports other than via its larger neighbor.  Firm i in
country I and firm n in country N each must choose a profit-maximizing location and
gross wage offer, subject to conditions that reflect various stages of economic integration.
Each firm’s ability to attract labor, and thereby produce goods for export, depends on its
own location and wage offer and, under regional integration, the location and wage offer
of the other firm.  The primary notation is summarized below.  Other notation will be
introduced as needed.
Notation
x distance from the port (at x = 0) located in country I
xi  firm i's chosen location
xn  firm n's chosen location
pi  export price (at x = 0) of firm i's product
pn  export price (at x = 0) of firm n's product
t    product transportation cost per mile to the port in country I
D uniform residential density (workers per mile)
ai firm i's fixed production coefficient (output per worker)
8an firm n's fixed production coefficient (output per worker)
Qi output of firm i
Qn output of firm n
wi gross wage offer of firm i at location xi
wn gross wage offer of firm n at location xn
Li number of workers employed by firm i
Ln number of workers employed by firm n
c  worker commuting cost per mile
i profit of firm i
n profit of firm n
NWI net wages to workers living in country I
NWN  net wages to workers living in country N
NW net wages to workers in the region (= NWI + NWN)
WI welfare in country I (= NWI + i)
WN welfare in country N (= NWN + n)
W  total welfare in the region (= WI + WN)
The two firms must locate along a closed line segment [0, xN].  The line segment
is divided into two parts [0, xI] and [xI, xN] that represent the two countries, I and N,
respectively.  We assume that xI  > (xN - xI) to reflect the imbalance in geographic size.
Each firm exports its product to the world through country I 's port at x = 0.  The two
firms compete for workers who are distributed along the entire line segment at a uniform
density of D workers per mile.  It follows that each country’s population is proportional
to its geographic size or “length.”  Workers must always reside in their home country, but
under various stages of regional integration they may be allowed to commute across the
common border at xI to supply labor services.  For simplicity, both product transportation
costs and worker commuting costs are assumed to be linear functions of distance.  Figure
91 illustrates the spatial model with net wages (gross wage less commuting costs)
declining with distance from each firm.  The dashed portions of the net wage lines are
relevant only when workers are allowed to commute across the common border at xI.
The x-axis measures the distance of each firm or worker from the port.  Note that, in
Figure 1, both firms have chosen interior locations, but corner solutions also can occur.
[FIGURE 1]
Regional Integration, Labor Mobility, and Labor Shares
The ultimate goal of integration is to allow not just free trade between member
countries in a regional bloc, but also full mobility of inputs and firms between member
countries.  Under such conditions, we also might expect production technologies and
output quality to converge over time as technical information spreads and competition
reduces quality differences.  Of course the actual degree of regional integration may vary.
Depending on the degree of integration and the economic and geographic features of
member countries, such pacts could significantly affect the decisions and performance of
firms in the region.  Our model focuses on firms’ location and wage decisions, which in
turn affect output levels, profits, and the net wages of workers in both countries.
Labor typically is the most important factor of production, particularly in capital-
scarce developing economies.  If a firm’s technology is labor-intensive, the firm’s output
and profit depend largely on its ability to attract workers and the wage rate it must offer
to do so.  Consequently, the profit-seeking firm must select a location where it can
capture a sufficiently large number of workers at a wage it can afford to pay.  Both the
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wage and location decisions will influence the amount of labor a firm can attract, but the
wage-location decisions of other firms also will affect the outcome if there is active
competition for labor.
Our model considers two firms that compete for workers, so we need to specify some
mechanism to determine the share of labor from each residential site that chooses to work
for each firm.  For this purpose, we use a logistic function1 t  determine each firm’s share
of the workers who commute from any particular residential site x e [0, xN].  Since the
total share of workers at any x is one, firm i's share of the workers residing at x is denoted
si(x) and firm n's share of the workers from x is denoted sn(x) = 1 - si(x).  The share of
workers residing at x that works for each firm is assumed to depend on the difference in
net wages (gross wage less commuting costs) at x, defined as:
d(x) = wi(x) -wn(x) , (1)
where  wi(x) = (wi - c|xi - x|)  and  wn(x) = (wn - c|xn - x|) are the net wage functions of
firm i and firm n, as depicted in Figure 1.  With the logistic function, the share of workers
from any particular residential site x that works for firm i is:
                                                
1
 While the logistic model is frequently used by researchers in marketing [Ben Akiva and Lerman 1986;
and MaFadden 1986], Anderson and de Palma (1992) also have used a logistic function in location theory
to model competition under product differentiation. Instead of the distinct (typically endogenous) market
boundaries that characterize traditional models of spatial competition, the logistic specification allows the
two firms’ labor market areas to overlap.  Rather than assuming that the firm offering the highest net wage
at x attracts all workers from that site, the logistic function indicates that the firm offering a higher net wage
attracts a higher proportion of workers.  Some workers may still opt to work for the other firm.  The
approach has some appeal, but it also allows us to avoid some technical problems that crop up in a model
where both prices (or wages) and locations are endogenous.
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si(x) = 1/[k + mb
d(x)] , (2)
where k, m, and b are parameters that will be further restricted.  Firm n attracts the
residual share of workers from site x:
sn(x) = 1 - {1/[k + mb 
d(x) ]} . (3)
To ensure that si(x) increases with the net wage difference, d(x), and to ensure that si(x) =
sn(x) = 0.5 when d(x) = 0, the parameters k, m, and b must be restricted (see Appendix);
we assume that k e  (0, 2), m = 2-k;  and b e  (0, 1).  Figure 2 shows a numerical example
of this logistic function (k = 1, m = 1, b = 0.1), which gives firm i’s labor share, si(x), for
any net wage difference, d(x), at location x.  The function intersects the vertical axis at
0.5, indicating that if net wages at x are equal, that is d(x) = 0, each firm attracts half of
the workers who reside at x.
[FIGURE 2]
The total amount of labor secured by each firm depends on the labor share functions, (2)
and (3), which in turn depend on the wage difference, d(x), at each location.  As can be
seen in Figure 1, the wage-location decisions of each firm, (wi, xi) and (wn, xn), determine
the spatial pattern of wage differentials and, hence, the allocation of labor to firms.  The
two profit-maximizing firms, i and n, are assumed to choose optimal wage-location
combinations, subject to any restrictions that accompany various stages of regional
integration.  Assuming Nash behavior, each firm regards the wage-location decision of
the other firm as given.  The Nash equilibrium wage-location combinations provide no
incentive for either firm to move or to further adjust its wage offer.
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 The two firms have potentially different technologies and different product qualities.
The parameters ai and an represent the production technologies of firms i and n.  The
model initially assumes that firm i is both more efficient (ai > an) and produces higher
quality output than firm n, as reflected in their export prices (pi > pn).  Later these
assumptions are relaxed to examine the effects of technological convergence and product
homogeneity that might result from the improved information flows and greater
competition that should accompany full regional integration.
Firm i
If regional integration allows mobility, more specifically commuting, of workers
between countries, workers are more likely to work for the firm that offers higher net
wages, regardless of the firm’s home country.  The amount of labor that firm i captures
from a particular residential site x can be computed as the product of the firm's share of
labor from that location, si(x), and the uniform labor density, D.  Under full labor
mobility, the total labor (Li) attracted by firm i from the entire region [0, xN] when it
locates at some xi (< xn) is found by integrating the logistic labor share function, si(x),
over various segments of the linear labor market, and multiplying the results by D:
Li = D [ si1(x)dx
0
xi
ò + si2(x)dx
xi
xn
ò + si3(x)dx
xn
xN
ò ] (4)
where si1(x), si2(x), and si3(x) represent the labor shares of firm i on the line segments
[0, xi], [xi, xn], and [xn, xN], respectively.  (Figure 1 illustrates this segmentation.)  Since
the net wages vary along different line segments, the workers' decisions to supply labor to
a particular firm depend on the net wage differences d1(x), d2(x), and d3(x), as defined for
(6) below, within the line segments [0,xi], [xi, xn], and [xn, xN], respectively.  With its
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fixed-coefficient production (Qi = aiLi) and the assumption that each unit of output must
be shipped to the port at a cost of txi to fetch the export price pi, the profit function of firm
i at location xi can be written:
i = (pi - txi)Qi - wiLi = [(pi - txi)ai - wi ]Li . (5)
Using (2), with the restrictions noted earlier, and (4) in equation (5), the profit function of
firm i can be restated:
i (xi,wi;xn,wn, p,t,c,b,k) = [(pi - txi)ai - wi]D{ [
0
xi
ò k + (2 - k)bd1(x) ]- 1 + [
xi
xn
ò k + (2 - k)bd2(x) ]- 1
+ [
xn
xN
ò k + (2 - k)bd3(x)]- 1dx} (6)
where the net wage differences are, for:
[0, xi], d(x)= d1 (x) º  {[ wi - c ( xi  -x)] - [(wn - c ( xn -x)]};
[xi, xn], d(x)= d2 (x) º  {[ wi - c (x- xi )] - [( wn - c ( xn -x)]};
[xn, xN], d(x)= d3 (x) º  {[ wi - c (x- xi )] - [( wn - c (x- xn )]}.
Firm i selects a profit-maximizing location-wage pair (xi, wi), given firm n's location
and wage decisions (xn, wn), the export price for its own product (pi), its own technology
(ai), product transportation costs (t), worker commuting costs (c), and parameters (b, k) of
the logistic labor share function.  The firm's optimal location-wage pair jointly satisfies
the conditions: i/ xi = 0 and  i / wi = 0.  These conditions yield firm i's Nash
response functions.
Firm n
Similarly, with full labor mobility, the amount of labor available to firm n when it
locates at xn is determined by the number of workers it can attract from the entire region,
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[0, xN].  The model assumes that workers must supply labor to either firm i or firm n.  The
region's total population is DxN, so the labor attracted by firm n will be:
Ln = (DxN - Li). (7)
Thus, with Qn = anLn, firm n's profit is
pn =  (pn - t xn) Qn – wn Ln= [ (pn - t xn) an – wn ] ](DxN - Li)   (8)
where Li is given by (4).  Making the necessary substitutions, we get:
n(xn,wn; xi,wi,pn,an,t,c,b,k)  = [(pn - txn)an - wn] D [xN - { [k + (2 - k)
d1(x)b ]
- 1dx
0
xi
ò
+ [k + (2 - k) d2(x)b ]
- 1dx
xi
xn
ò + [k + (2 - k) d3(x)b ]- 1
xn
xN
ò }dx] (9)
Firm n selects a profit-maximizing location-wage pair (xn, wn), given firm i's location
and wage decisions (xi, wi), the export price for its own product (pn), its own technology
(an), and other parameters of the model (t,c,b,k).  The firm's optimal location-wage pair
satisfies the conditions: n/ xn = 0 and  n / wn = 0, which define firm n's Nash
response functions.
Equilibrium Locations and Wages
If regional integration allows full mobility of workers and firms across borders, the
location and wage offer of each firm depend on the other firm's location and wage offer.
This interdependency is adequately captured by Nash behavior: each firm's wage-location
choices are conditional on the other firm's choices.  The Nash equilibrium (*) locations
and wage offers   {xi*, wi*, xn*, wn*} are found by simultaneously solving the two sets of
first-order conditions { i/ xi = 0, i / wi = 0, n/ xn = 0, n / wn = 0}.  Various
degrees of regional integration may impose additional constraints (e.g., labor might be
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allowed to commute across the border while firms might be constrained to a domestic
location).
Even with simple technologies and inelastic individual labor supply, simultaneous
solution of the four first-order conditions does not give simple reduced-form expressions
for {xi*, wi*, xn*, wn*}.  This, together with constraints imposed by incomplete regional
integration and the possibility of corner solutions, means that simulation methods must be
used to analyze the effects of parameter changes on the equilibrium behavior of firms and
associated outcomes for the two countries and their residents.
We consider three main cases.  First, an autarky case will be examined in which
firms and workers in each country are not allowed cross the border at xI.  Each firm must
operate in its home country and each worker must supply labor to the domestic firm.  The
model, however, assumes that this autarky restriction does not prevent firm n from
shipping its product to the world through country I’s port at x = 0.  In the second case,
which represents an initial limited stage of integration, each country allows workers, but
not firms, to commute across the border at xI.  Finally, the third case will allow full
mobility of workers and firms across the border.  This third stage of the analysis also will
allow production technologies and product qualities (reflected in export prices) to
converge due to full regional integration.
IV. STAGES OF INTEGRATION
Case 1: Autarky
Strict autarky limits the movement of factors and firms between countries.  Such
restrictions preclude competition for labor between firms in different countries and, under
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autarky, the wage-location decisions of one firm in our model do not affect the other
firm's wage-location decisions.  Under these conditions, and with inelastic labor supply,
each firm's location decision depends only on product transportation costs.  To minimize
such transportation costs, each firm optimally locates as close to the port as autarky
permits: firm i locates at the port (xi* = 0) and fully eliminates product transportation
costs; firm n locates at the common border (xn* = xI) and ships its output across country I
to the port.
Under autarky, workers are "captive" and must supply labor to their domestic firm.
Complete exploitation is averted in this case by assuming that the (gross) wage in each
country is parametric, but possibly different from the wage in the other country.  This
assumption is needed only for autarky, where the absence of competition for labor by
profit-maximizing firms would drive wage offers to zero if workers have no reservation
wage.  In the simulations that follow, the parametric wages in the autarky case will be set
at levels that enable comparisons with subsequent cases that allow for greater mobility of
labor, and ultimately firms.
Figure 3 can be used to visualize the autarky case.  The line segment [0, xI]
represents the size of country I, while [xI, xN ] represents the size of country N.  To reflect
the imbalance in geographic size (and population) between the two countries, the
simulations assume that xI > (xN -xI).  In the autarky case, regardless of the parametric
wage levels, firm i maximizes its profits by locating at the port (xi* = 0) and firm n
maximizes its profit by locating at the common border (xn* = xI).  Within the context of
the model, where workers have no reservation wage, autarky implies that each firm
captures all the labor in its home country: Li* = xID and Ln* = (xN - xI)D, where D is the
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uniform density of workers.  The net wage line (gross wage less commuting costs) for
each firm slopes downward to the right, with movement away from each firm's "corner"
location.
[FIGURE 3]
Net Wages to Workers Under Autarky
As measures of worker well-being in country I and country N, we construct the
expressions for net wages, NWI and NWN, respectively.  A worker's net wage declines
with commuting distance.  Because, in the autarky case, firm i optimally locates at xi* = 0
and firm n optimally locates at xn* = xI, the net welfare of workers in each country is
computed as:
  
NWI = D[ {wi - c (xi - x)}dx
0
xi
ò + + {wi - c(x - xi)}dx]
xi
xI
ò (10)
 = D [ wixI - 0.5cxI
2 ]
and
  
NWN = D [ {wn - c (xn - x )}dx
xI
xn
ò + {wn - c(x - xn)}dx]
xn
xN
ò (11)
= D [wn(xN - xI) - 0.5c(xN - xI)
2 ]
Again, the above expressions for NWI and NWN hold only if xi* = 0 and xn* = xI.
The total net wages (NW) to workers in the region (i.e., both countries) is found by
summing the net wages to workers in each country:
NW = NWI + NWN (12)
18
Similarly, the total welfare (W) of the region is the summation of the two firms' profits
and the total net wages of workers in both countries:
W = i + n+ NW (13)
Autarky Simulation
Table 1 summarizes a numerical example for the autarky case. Parameter values are
somewhat arbitrary but yield a feasible baseline solution.  The parameter values in the
autarky case are assigned so that results can be readily compared with subsequent labor
mobility and full mobility cases under regional integration.  In addition to firm i's
geographic advantages (better access to port and larger size) over firm n, firm i is
relatively more productive than firm n (i.e., ai > an).  Similarly, the more efficient firm i
also produces a higher quality product, as reflected in export prices (pi > pn).  The
inequalities will eventually be relaxed in the full mobility case, where long-run mobility
of labor and firms causes a convergence of the firms' technologies and product qualities
(export prices).
As noted earlier, the autarky case requires a special treatment of wages.  With no
reservation wage for labor, producers could potentially drive the endogenous wages of
"captive workers" to zero in their quest for profits.  To provide a more realistic basis for
comparison with subsequent regional integration cases, this study pegs autarky wages to
levels that emerge endogenously in the labor mobility case (Table 2), the first form of
regional integration we consider.
[TABLE 1]
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Case 2: Labor Mobility
The labor mobility case allows workers to commute across the common border, but
each firm must remain in its home country: xi* e  [0, xI] and xn* e  [xI, xN].  Subject to the
restriction, each firm must balance the transportation cost advantages of locating as near
to the port as possible against the need to attract labor, which can now work for either
firm by possibly commuting across the border at xI.  Consider the tradeoffs faced by each
firm.
Firm i could still locate at the port (xi* = 0) and eliminate product transport costs, as
it did under autarky.  But, for any chosen wi*, a movement away from the port raises its
net wage to workers at interior sites, who would have a shorter distance to commute.
This allows firm i to compete more effectively for labor at interior sites in its own
country as well as for labor in country N, which is now allowed to cross the border and
work for firm i.  Alternatively, firm i could attract more labor by simply raising wi*.
Competition for the regional labor pool was absent under autarky because workers in
each country had to work for their domestic firm.  Now, with labor allowed to commute
across the common border, firms may use both location and wage decisions to actively
compete for labor.  For profit-seeking firms, the revenue gains from attracting more labor
through wage or plant location adjustments must be balanced against the additional wage
bill and higher product transportation costs.
What about firm n's new tradeoffs?  Before, under autarky, firm n could comfortably
locate as close to the port as permitted (xn* = xI) and still be assured of employing all the
workers from country N.  With labor mobility, however, all workers in N have the option
to commute across the common border to work for firm i.  For any wn* it chooses,
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moving away from the common border (xn* > xI) may help firm n to retain domestic
workers, but it will reduce its ability to attract workers from country I (who now have the
option to commute into N) and will raise the cost of shipping its output to the port.
Depending on the relative size of these effects, firm n might optimally choose some xn* >
xI or, if transport costs are sufficiently high, continue to "hug" the border (xn* = xI), as it
did under autarky.  Figure 4 illustrates a labor mobility case where firm i has moved
away from the port (xi* > 0) but firm n continues to locate at the common border (xn* =
xI).  This is the outcome that occurs in our labor mobility simulation.
[FIGURE 4]
Net Wages to Workers Under Labor Mobility
Relaxing the constraints on where workers can supply their labor requires some
changes in earlier expressions.  Labor mobility allows workers to supply labor in either
country, so the total net wages (gross wages less commuting costs) of workers living in
one country is the sum of the net wages of those workers, whether they are employed by
the domestic firm or the foreign firm.  The net wages of country I residents who work for
either firm i or firm n is denoted NWI.  Because each firm, in this case, is still restricted to
its own country (i.e., xi* e  [0, xI] and xn* e  [xI, xN]), the expression for NWI in the labor
mobility case is:
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NWI = D[ {s i1( x) [wi - c( x i - x)]
0
xi
ò + [1 - s i1( x)][ wn - c(xn - x)]}dx
+ {si2(x)[wi - c(x - xi)]
xi
xI
ò + [1- si2(x)][wn - c(xn - x)]}dx] 14( )
Similarly, in the labor mobility case, the expression for the net wages of country N
residents who work for either firm i or firm n is:
  
NWN = D[ i2{s
xI
xn
ò (x)[ iw - c(x - ix )] + [1 - i 2s (x)][ nw - c( nx - x)]}dx
+
i3{s
xn
xN
ò (x)[ iw - c(x - ix )]
+ [1 - i3s (x)][ nw - c(x - nx )]}dx] (15)
Labor Mobility Simulation
Table 2 gives results for the labor mobility simulation.  The same parameter values
used in the autarky case (Table 1) are repeated.  Two differences have been introduced:
first, with labor mobility, firms can now hire labor from both countries; second, wages
(along with firm locations) are now determined endogenously by Nash-competition
between firms i and n. Unlike the autarky case, where wages had to be exogenous to
prevent the full exploitation of inelastically supplied labor, labor mobility forces the firms
to actively compete for workers.  This competition entails wage offers as well as
adjustments in location, still subject to the restriction that each firm must remain in its
home country.  To compare the results of partial regional integration--mobility of labor
but not firms--with autarky results, Table 2 also shows, in parentheses, the numerical
change in each variable as the system moves from autarky to labor mobility.
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[TABLE 2]
In the labor mobility case, firm i moves away from the port (xi* > 0) because it must
now compete with firm n for labor from both countries.  Notice that firm n's share of the
labor force grows with the switch from autarky to labor mobility.  Workers can now
commute across the common border, so some of the workers in country I, especially
those near the border (xI) are likely to receive higher net wages by working for firm n in
country N rather than commuting back toward the port to work for firm i, their home
country employer.  This shift of workers from firm i to firm n would be even larger if
firm i retained its port location to eliminate its product transportation costs.  But firm i
can control its loss of workers by moving away from the port and/or raising its wage offer
(wi*).  We see only the location adjustment here (xi* = 0.36) because wages in the
autarky case were exogenously set equal to the endogenous wages in the current labor
mobility case to avoid a degenerate outcome under autarky (zero wage offers) and to
facilitate comparison of the two cases.
Although firm i moves inward to compete more effectively for labor, it is still nearer
the port than firm n, which must remain in country N.  This inherent geographic
advantage keeps firm i's product shipment costs below firm n's and, coupled with its
productivity and output price advantages, allows it to offer a higher gross wage (wi* =
0.69) than its competitor (wn* = 0.46).  Firm i's higher wages also reflect the fact that,
under labor mobility, it must compete more actively for workers from both countries than
it did under autarky.  While we constructed a somewhat artificial autarky case with wages
pegged at the same levels seen here, an actual move from labor mobility back to autarky
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with endogenous wages would diminish spatial competition for labor and almost
certainly reduce wages in both countries.  Even when workers have positive reservation
wages, autarky allows domestic firms to exercise their spatial monopsony power without
having to worry about any external source of competition for labor.  They might have to
worry about losing some workers if wages are pushed below reservation levels, but they
don't have to worry about workers commuting across the border to work for a foreign
employer.
Despite its lack of a port, its smaller geographic size and population, and its
technological and market disadvantages, country N reaps certain benefits from partial
regional integration (i.e., labor mobility).  We stacked the deck against wage gains to
residents of N by setting autarky gross wages equal to the levels that emerge in the labor
mobility case.  As a result, total net wages to N's residents are actually lower (NWN* =
3.09) than under autarky (NWN* = 4.10) because some residents of N now commute
across the border to work for firm i.  Firm n's gain in profits (+25.28), however, more
than offsets this net wage loss, resulting in an increase in total welfare (nets wages plus
profits) in country N.  With an appropriate redistribution from firm n to residents of N,
both groups could benefit from this limited form of regional integration, despite the
country's seemingly weak initial hand.
The larger and better-endowed country I could be the loser and the source of
opposition to partial integration.  Because it must now compete for labor, firm i's output
(proportional to Li*) and profit decline.  Workers in country I benefit in the form of
higher net wages (+13.28), but this gain is too small to offset firm i's losses (-52.81), so
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total welfare in country I falls (-39.53) relative to the autarky case.  Since I's welfare loss
exceeds the N's welfare gain (+16.48), welfare in the region falls (-23.02).
The regional welfare loss under labor mobility arises largely from the decrease in
firm i's profits, which enjoyed considerable monopsony power over its large labor pool in
the autarky case.  Labor mobility reduces this monopsony power and forces firm i to
move from an "export-convenient" location (the port) to a more "worker-convenient"
location nearer the center of its labor pool.  This enhances firm i's ability to compete for
labor from both countries, but it also tends to reduce commuting costs and thereby
increase net wages for workers, especially those in country I.  Country N workers, some
of whom now commute into country I, experience a slight reduction in net wages, but the
output and profits of firm n rise considerably with the ability to draw workers from both
countries (Ln* increases from 10 under autarky to 32.43 when labor is mobile).  Welfare
in country N, the sum of firm n’s profit and net wages in country N, more than doubles,
while welfare in country I falls due to the reduction in firm i's monopsony power and
profits.  Introducing labor mobility in this model clearly alters the distribution of welfare
between firms and their workers: in this case, labor's share of the region's total welfare
increases from 0.133 to 0.221.
Case 3: Full Mobility
Full mobility allows firms as well as workers to cross the common border.  Unlike
the labor mobility case, firms i and n are no longer restricted to locate in their home
countries.  They can compete with each other for workers and locations in the region
without constraints: each firm can locate anywhere on the line segment [0, xN].  For
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simplicity, however, we assume that firm i never locates further from the port than does
firm n, or xi* £  xn*.  Removal of the border constraint for firms, which represents a
second and more complete stage of regional integration, further affects workers' net
wages, firms' profits, and overall welfare in each country and the region.  In general, full
mobility of firms and workers is expected to increase the region's welfare relative to the
previous case where only workers are fully mobile.  Figure 5 illustrates a possible
outcome in the full mobility case.
[FIGURE 5]
Net Wages to Workers Under Full Mobility
If firm n continues to locate in country N, the computation of NWI, the net wages to
workers who live in country I, is similar to that in the labor mobility case.  But, if firm n
locates in I rather than its home country N, and is no closer to the port than firm i (that is,
if xi* £  xn*£  xI), the net wages to country I's workers must be written as:
  
NWI = D[ {s i1( x)[wi - c( x i - x)]
0
xi
ò + [1 - s i1( x)][ wn - c(xn - x)]}dx
+ {si2(x)[wi - c(x - xi )]
xi
xn
ò + [1- si 2(x)][wn - c(xn - x)]}dx
+
xn
xI
ò {[si3(x)][wi - c(x - xi)] + [1- si3(x)][wn - c(x - xn)]}dx] (16)
Similarly, if xi* £  xn*£  xI, the net wages to country N's workers in the full mobility case
are given by:
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If either firm chooses to still locate in country N, the expression for NWN becomes more
complex.
Full Mobility Simulation
Mobility, proximity, and interaction can reduce technological and market disparities.
In this simulation, in addition to allowing workers to commute across the common border
at xI and allowing firms to locate anywhere in the region (subject to xI* £  xn*), we also
allow firms' production technologies and product qualities (reflected in export prices) to
converge, that is: ai = an and pi = pn.  Results in Table 3 show the effects of full regional
integration, including technological and product quality convergence, on the firms'
location choices and wage offers.  Also shown are the effects on firms' labor shares and
profits, and the net wages and total welfare (net wages plus profits) accruing to each
country and the fully integrated region.
[TABLE 3]
Removing any technical or product quality differences between the two firms, and
allowing both to locate anywhere within the region, places the two firms on an equal
footing.  Not surprisingly, this equivalence leads the two firms to cluster at the same
location (xi* = xn* = 0.25) and to offer the same gross wage (wi* = wn* = 1.51).
  
NWN = D[ {si3 (x)[wi - c(x - xi )]
xI
xN
ò + [1 - si3(x)][wn - c(x - xn)]}dx] 17( )
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The labor pool is split (Li* = Ln* = 50) and profits are identical (pi* = pn* = 43.43).  This
relaxation of the firm location constraint favors firm n, which can now mover closer to
the port in Country I, reduce its product shipment costs, and increase its profits (+18.15)
relative to the labor mobility case.  Much of firm n's gain comes at the expense of firm i,
which loses workers (-17.57), despite offering a higher wage (+0.82), and experiences a
reduction in profits (-66.25).
The earlier move from autarky to labor mobility benefited workers, especially in
Country I.  Retaining this ability of workers to commute across the border, but also
allowing firms to locate anywhere in the region, further benefits workers in both
countries.  Net wages rise for workers in country I (+76.08) and country N (+4.98).  The
total increase in regional net wages (+81.05) exceeds the loss in regional profits, resulting
in a regional welfare gain (+32.93) under full mobility.  Some of the gains to labor in the
full mobility case are also attributable to the increase in firm n's productivity (an) and the
increase in its product quality, as reflected in the export price (pn) it receives for its
output.
V. FINAL REMARKS
While we generally should expect the relaxation of location or economic constraints
to increase regional welfare, the composition of these welfare gains is more surprising.
One might expect that larger countries with clear initial advantages in geographic size,
transportation assets, productivity, and product quality might dominate any regional
integration with smaller countries that "bring little to the table."  Indeed, many small
countries probably see high risks in entering into lopsided regional agreements with
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dominant neighbors.  The present analysis has many limitations, but simulation results
suggest that both limited and more complete forms of regional integration might benefit
both workers and firms in smaller countries.  These benefits are more likely to come at
the expense of the larger country's firms, since workers in the larger country also appear
to gain from the increased competition for their services.  The strongest opposition to
such agreements might actually come from firms in the larger, better-endowed country.
Even if the partners are small and resource-poor, regional integration may still dissipate
the monopsony power of firms in the larger country, allowing firms in the smaller
country to compete for labor and other regional resources and to gain access to unique
transportation assets and better technologies.  These efficiencies help to explain the
potential overall welfare gains of regional integration.
Ironically, given the adverse effects on firms in the dominant country, the key to
more universal support for regional integration might lie in subsidies to dominant-country
firms.  Given the overall welfare gains, such transfers might be feasible and could leave
all parties better off than before integration.  Such transfers, of course, may seem
unnecessary and unfair to all parties except the dominant-country firms, helping to
explain why regional integration has not progressed in some areas.  Small-country fears
about unbalanced coalitions, though perhaps unfounded, combined with potential losses
to large-country firms and political resistance to compensating for these losses may be
sufficient to block many regional integration proposals.
This model is designed to explore the effects of regional integration in an
asymmetric setting, where one country enjoys significant advantages over another
potential bloc member.  We have focused on the equilibrium locations and wage offers of
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firms, ignoring potential impacts on local product markets and land markets.
Incorporating such markets, without excluding some present features of the model, is
challenging and, a priori, we cannot exactly say how these additions might affect our
results.  We hope the model provides a useful vehicle for better understanding the
obstacles to unbalanced regional integration.
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APPENDIX
Logistic function parameter restrictions
To ensure the desired properties of the logistic function
si(x) = 1/[k + mb
d(x)  ],
the parameters are restricted as follows.  Suppose the net wage differential at some
residential site x miles from the port is zero, that is:
d(x) = wi(x) - wn(x) = 0.
Each firm should receive the same share of labor commuting from this site.
This implies that:
si(x) = 1/[k + mb
d(x) ] = 1/(k + m) = 1/2.
Therefore, to ensure that shares are equal whenever d (x) = 0, we need to set: k + m = 2,
or m = 2 - k.  Substituting this restriction into the logistic function gives:
si(x) = 1/[k + (2-k)b
d(x)].
Differentiating with respect to the net wage differential, d(x), gives:
si(x) / d(x) = [-b 
d(x) (2-k)(ln b)] / [b d(x) (2-k) + k] 2
The denominator is strictly positive, so for si(x) to be an increasing function of d(x), the
numerator also needs to be positive.  Note that ln b is defined only if b > 0, and if b > 0,
then b d(x)  > 0 for any value of d(x), positive or negative.  If we further restrict b to the
open unit interval, b e  (0,1), then ln b < 0 and the numerator will be positive, as required,
if k < 2.  Recapping, we assume that:  b e  (0,1), k e  (0,2), and m = 2-k.
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Figure 1: Spatial Layout
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Figure 2: Logit Model
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Figure 3: Autarky Case
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Figure 4: Labor Mobility Case
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Figure 5: Full Mobility Case
0    xi* * =    xI
   wi*
wn*
Net Wage ($/L)
xN
Country I
Country N
Port
Firm i Firm n
Border
   xn*
39
________________________________________________________________________
Table 1: Autarky Simulation Results
Parameters
output prices:  pi  = 0.25,  pn = 0.20
technologies: ai = 10,  an = 8
spatial: xI  = 0.9,  xN = 1,  D = 100,  t = 0.05,  c = 1
Outcomes
firm i: xi* = 0.0 wi* = 0.69 Li* = 90 i* = 162.49
firm n: xn* = 0.9 wn* = 0.46 Ln* = 10 n* = 7.79
country I: NWI* = 21.96 WI  = NWI* + i* = 184.45
country N: NWN* = 4.10 WN  = NWN* + n* = 11.89
region: NW* = 26.06 W* = 196.34
Note:  Here, wi* and wn* are exogenous and set equal to the endogenous values in the subsequent labor
mobility case.
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2: Labor Mobility Simulation Results
Parameters
output prices:  pi = 0.25,  pn = 0.20
technologies: ai = 10,  an = 8
spatial: xI = 0.9,  xN = 1,  D = 100,  t = 0.05,  c = 1
logistic: k = 1,  b = 0.1,  m = 1
  Outcomes
firm i: xi* = 0.36 wi* = 0.69 Li* = 67.57 i* = 109.68
(+0.36) (0) (-22.43) (-52.81)
firm n: xn* = 0.9 wn* = 0.46 Ln* = 32.43 n* = 25.28
(0) (0) (+22.43) (+17.49)
country I: NWI* = 35.24 WI = NWI* + i* = 144.92
(+13.28) (-39.53)
country N: NWN* = 3.09 WN = NWN* + n* = 28.37
(-1.01) (+16.48)
region: NW* = 38.34 W* = 173.32
(+12.28) (-23.02)
Note:  The endogenous values of wi* and wn* were used as parameters in the earlier autarky case.  Numbers
in parentheses below the outcome values show changes from the autarky case in Table 1.
_______________________________________________________________________
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Table 3: Full Mobility Simulation Results
Parameters
output prices:  pi = 0.25,  pn = 0.25
technologies: ai = 10,  an = 10
spatial: xI = 0.9,  xN = 1,  D = 100,  t = 0.05,  c = 1
logistic: k = 1,  b = 0.1,  m = 1
Outcomes
firm i: xi* = 0.25 wi* = 1.51 Li* = 50 i* = 43.43
(-0.11) (+0.82) (-17.57) (-66.25)
firm n: xn* = 0.25 wn* = 1.51 Ln* = 50 n* = 43.43
(-0.65) (+1.05) (+17.57) (+18.15)
country I: NWI* = 111.32 WI = NWI* + i* = 154.75
(+76.08) (+9.83)
country N: NWN* = 8.07 WN = NWN* + n* = 51.50
(+4.98) (+23.13)
region: NW* = 119.39 W* = 206.25
(+81.05) (+32.93)
Note:  Numbers in parentheses below the outcome values show changes from the labor mobility case in
Table 2.
________________________________________________________________________
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